Allgemeines Diskussionsforum ⇒ IWF veröffentlicht Brief der Ukraine vom Juli

[Handrij]

Ein interessantes Dokument mit den Selbstverpflichtungen der Regierung, welches vom Präsidenten, der Premierministerin, dem kommissarischen Finanzminister und dem Zentralbankpräsidenten unterzeichnet wurde.
Interessant sind insbesondere die Annahmen für die ökonomische Entwicklung der Ukraine in diesem Jahr und im nächsten. So wird in diesem Jahr von einem Schrumpfen des BIP von 14% ausgegangen und im nächsten Jahr soll ein Wachstum von 3% erfolgen - Kunststück nach solch einer Schrumpfkur. Darüber hinaus findet sich hier z.B. eine Begründung warum der Block Julia Timoschenko nicht ebenso populistisch ein erhöhtes gesetzlich Existenzminimum fordert wie die Partei der Regionen. "Wir werden solche Gesetze mit einem Veto verhindern". Ebenso ist die Erhöhung der Gastarife für die Bevölkerung und die Industriebetriebe enthalten.

Das Original mit den Anhängen findet sich Nur eingeloggte Mitglieder sehen alle Links ....
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UKRAINE: LETTER OF INTENT
Kyiv, July 23, 2009
Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn
Managing Director,
International Monetary Fund
Washington DC, 20431, U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Strauss-Kahn:
1. Like most European economies, the economy of Ukraine has been affected by the
negative effects of the global financial and economic crisis. Weak external demand, the low
level of international steel prices, the sharp increase of our energy import prices, and tight
global financing conditions as well as a reduction of credit provided by the banking system
have taken a severe toll on economic activity. However, in the last few months, financial
strains in Ukraine have moderated significantly and there are some signs that the economy is
stabilizing. Our efforts remain geared towards supporting macroeconomic stability and
generating a rapid yet sustainable rebound of our economy.
2. Despite the difficult environment, policy implementation since the first review has
been in line with our commitments. The end-May 2009 quantitative performance criteria on
base money, net international reserves, and the cash deficit of the general government have
been met. We have made progress with the resolution of the systemic problem banks and in
preparing legislation to improve the bank resolution framework. We have also strengthened
our efforts to raise financing for the budget from domestic sources, including by offering
market rates in our treasury bills auctions.
3. In light of this performance and our continued commitment to the program, we
request completion of the Second Review under the Stand By Arrangement. Given the sharp
reduction in economic activity and its impact on public finances as well as the deterioration
in the financial situation of Naftogaz, we request a broadening of the fiscal deficit target to
include the deficit of Naftogaz and a modification of the performance criterion on the fiscal
deficit. We have maintained import restrictions for two product groups, but these restrictions
will expire on September 7, 2009. Finally, we would like to request that the full amount of
the next tranche be disbursed directly to the budget to finance the fiscal deficit, including the
repayment of the external obligations by the Government. We commit to full accountability
and to provide information on a regular basis as to how the resources are being used.
4. We believe that the policies set forth in the letters of October 31 2008; April 30 2009;
and this letter are adequate to achieve the objectives of our economic program, but we stand
ready to take additional measures as appropriate. As is standard under all IMF arrangements,
we will consult with the IMF before modifying measures contained in this letter or adopting
new measures that would deviate from the goals of the program, and provide the IMF with
the necessary information for program monitoring.
Yours sincerely,

Yulia Timoshenko
Prime Minister of Ukraine

Victor Yushchenko
President of Ukraine

Ihor Umanskiy
Acting Minister of Finance

Volodymyr Stelmakh
Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine

UKRAINE—MEMORANDUM OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES

A. Macroeconomic framework
1. Due to the deepening of the global recession in the first quarter of 2009, weakening
terms of trade, and the deterioration of financial conditions, the outflow of deposits and the
contraction of credit to economy turned out worse than expected. As a result, the decline in
real GDP in 2009 is expected to be more pronounced than the 8 percent that was projected at
the time of the first program review, possibly reaching approximately -14 percent. However,
going forward, we believe that the improvement of global economic conditions and the
implementation of the policies of our economic program will facilitate the strengthening of
our banking sector and general confidence, allowing for a resumption of the flow of credit to
enterprises and households and a rebound of our export sector and economy. We expect our
economy to grow by around 3 percent in 2010.
2. Developments in inflation and our balance of payments have been better than
expected. Continued effective implementation of anti-inflation policies, the strengthening of
our anti-crisis efforts, the coordination of monetary and exchange rate policies of the NBU
with the fiscal policy of the Government, and the commitments under the joint economic
program supported by the IMF have allowed us to bring inflation down. We now expect
inflation at around 13 percent by the end of the year compared to 16 percent at the time of the
first program review. Our balance of payment has adjusted significantly. During the first 5
months of 2009, merchandise imports and exports contracted by 52 percent and 44 percent,
respectively, compared to the same period in 2008. Until May, rollover rates for private
external debt held up relatively well. Our current account is expected to record a surplus of
about 0.5 percent of GDP in 2009.

B. Fiscal Policy
3. At end-May, the cash deficit of the general government was 1.8 percent of GDP,
below the program ceiling of 2.4 percent of GDP. However, the outlook for public finances
has worsened significantly since the first program review and without offsetting measures,
the general government deficit according to the projections may increase from 4 percent to
6.5 percent of GDP in 2009 (excluding bank recapitalization costs). We believe that it is
appropriate to broaden the fiscal aggregates monitored under the program to explicitly cover
the deficit of Naftogaz, estimated at 2.7 percent of GDP (Hrv 25 billion).
4. To keep our public finances in a structurally sound position, we have announced
corrective measures amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP to contain the general government
deficit to 6 percent of GDP in 2009, excluding banks’ recapitalization costs and the Naftogaz
deficit to 2.6 percent of GDP.
5. These measures, together with the structural measures and reforms we plan to
implement in 2010, will help us contain the general government deficit in 2010, based on
realistic macroeconomic assumptions and revenue projections. This will start the process of
fiscal consolidation and ensure medium term debt sustainability. We have publicly
committed to a 4 percent deficit target for 2010 and have taken the following measures:
[*] To improve the financial position of Naftogaz, we have capitalized Naftogaz by UAH
18.6 billion. We have also announced increases of gas tariffs paid by households
(effective September 1, 2009) and utility companies (effective October 1, 2009)
by 20 percent (prior action). This will bring these tariffs to the levels of 31 and 43
percent of import prices, respectively. We have also announced a schedule
of 20 percent quarterly price increases for households and utility companies starting
in January 2010 (prior action). We have formed a taskforce to enforce the existing
social safety net to effectively protect poor households. Our objective is to achieve
convergence of all tariffs with import prices, while maintaining effective safety nets
to protect vulnerable groups.
[*] We have adjusted electricity tariffs (for consumption of electricity over 600 kw),
taken measures to strengthen tax administration in line with IMF advice, and plan to
reduce our expenditure by curtailing the expenditures for goods and services in nonpriority
areas. Social transfers will be better targeted as well.
[*] We have adopted and announced a time-bound road map describing the schedule and
main steps in the design of pension and tax reform. We will issue, by end-September,
a comprehensive analysis of the situation of the pension system and the tax system,
on which basis we will recommend concrete policy actions by end-October 2009.
[*] We will contain local government expenditures, including payments to contractual
workers, in line with the budgeted amounts and will not introduce any tax amnesty
nor implement a moratorium on tax audits.
6. While we will continue to protect the most vulnerable groups of the population from
the effects of the crisis, we are also aware that a quick adjustment of our economy to the
large external shocks it is facing requires a temporary tightening of our incomes policies. Our
strategy will thus be to continue to limit the increase in both minimum and average public
wages and pensions, and other social transfers, in line with projected inflation in 2009
(average and end-period basis). We do not support the approval by the Parliament of the draft
bills, which would envisage an increase in minimum wages and pensions to unsustainable
levels for public finances, and any such bill will be vetoed.
7. We are fully committed to take structural measures to strengthen the financial
situation, transparency, and governance of Naftogaz. By end-September, we will pass the
legislative amendments in order to introduce the distribution accounts for the heating utilities
by the independent regulator (NERC), and eliminate the ban on penalties for households who
do not pay their gas and communal utility bills. We have adopted a revised 2009 financial
plan and developed a 2010 projected financial plan (prior action) for the company which, in
addition to the gas price increases mentioned above, envisages measures to increase payment
discipline by households and utility companies, and a strengthened heating tariff setting
mechanism. We have commissioned a special audit of Naftogaz by an international audit
firm, to put in place a monitoring framework for the cash result of the company and to
establish a regular (monthly) and timely public reporting of key financial data (prior action).
8. Efforts made in recent months to develop domestic financing sources for the
government have started to bear fruit. We have been able to place increasing amounts of
domestic debt in recent weeks as the bonds carried interest rates more closely aligned with
market rates. We are continuing to actively work on procedures and instruments to develop a
domestic debt market. In parallel, we are strengthening our efforts to secure additional
funding from multilateral and bilateral creditors.
9. Within one year, the Government and the State Property Fund will privatize a number
of substantial enterprises, in particular oblast energy distribution companies. In addition, the
privatization of the “Odessa sea-port plant” will be completed in September on a competitive
basis with a broadest possible involvement of international investors.

C. Monetary, Exchange Rate and Financial Sector Policies

10. We are making efforts to improve the functioning of the foreign exchange market.
The official exchange rate is aligned with the average rate on the interbank market on the
previous day with a deviation not exceeding 2 percent of the market rate. We have been able
to seize on the recent positive developments in the foreign exchange market to buy a small
amount of reserves. We have stepped up our efforts to lift administrative controls on the
foreign exchange market, including by amending NBU regulation 108 to lift the ban on
foreign exchange forward and spot transactions (prior action), and by bringing regulations
107 and 109 in line with international good practices.
11. While inflation continues to fall and pressures on the hryvnia have recently eased,
which allowed us to reduce policy rates, we stand ready to tighten policies if pressures on the
exchange rate or inflation were to reemerge. The outflow of deposits from the banking
system has come to a halt, which has allowed us to revoke the requirement which limited the
possibility of withdrawal of deposits prior to maturity. Going forward, we will closely
monitor developments in monetary aggregates and bank liquidity and avoid a build up of a
large monetary overhang.
12. We have tightened the criteria for access to central bank liquidity, both for the regular
refinancing operations and for the liquidity support to problem banks. The agreed- uponprocedures
arrangement by Ernst and Young on the provision of refinance credit and foreign
currency to banks in the fourth quarter of 2008 was concluded. The preliminary results
suggest that the NBU followed approved procedures and authorization policies in conducting
these operations. We have shared the results with the IMF, and will publish the main findings
in accordance with the terms of reference for this arrangement that was agreed with the IMF.
13. With a view to strengthening the independence of the NBU we will, by end-
September 2009, enact legislation to strengthen the overall governance structure of the NBU
in line with our commitments under the program. We will also refrain from enacting
legislation that impinges on NBU independence and will veto any initiatives to this effect.
14. To restore financial stability and the conditions for a resumption of bank lending, we
intend to make rapid progress with our bank recapitalization and restructuring program.
Shareholders of most systemic private banks have already brought in the capital and we will
follow up closely with the shareholders of noncomplying banks to ensure that the remaining
capital pledges materialize. To improve communications with the home supervisors of parent
banks, we will aim to complete all pending MoUs by end-2009.
15. We will swiftly resolve the systemic problem banks. For the five systemic problem
banks where shareholders are unable to bring in the necessary capital, we have finalized the
resolution strategy and started implementation. Three of these banks have already been
recapitalized and we expect to make a decision by end-July regarding the expediency of the
state involvement in replenishing the capital of the other two banks. (prior action). This
strategy includes identifying a fair value of shares, recapitalization by the government and
appointment of a professional management. The banks will undergo a thorough due diligence
that includes an assessment of restructuring options post-recapitalization. To ensure rapid
progress, we have completed the setup and staffing of the relevant units at the MoF and in the
NBU. In the implementation of the recapitalization program, we will avoid undue monetary
expansion and safeguard the financial position of the NBU.
16. We have recapitalized the two state banks in line with the diagnostic results. By
September 2009, we will develop a set of measures to strengthen their financial
sustainability.
17. Preparations for the workouts of the non-systemic insolvent banks have been
progressing apace. The diagnostic studies for the Group 3 and 4 banks have been completed,
and banks have been informed about the needed capital increase by end-2009.
18. Legal amendments to identify ultimate controllers of banks and to strengthen the bank
resolution process, which will form the basis for the workouts of the non-systemic insolvent
banks, have been adopted (prior action). For these banks we will finalize the resolution
strategy and start its implementation by end-September, 2009.
19. More broadly, to strengthen our supervision framework, we are preparing
amendments to legislation with a view to implementing consolidated supervision and provide
for supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates. We plan to have these
amendments enacted by May 2010. Since April 2009, we have also required banks to
disclose detailed financial information.